In your book published last April, Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization, you speak about how megacities will displace nation states as the basis for our understanding of human civilization. One of your main arguments is that this growing connectivity will lead to greater economic growth and prosperity. However, don’t some of the populist events of the last year – from Brexit to the election of Donald Trump to the failed Italian referendum – suggest a backlash against this trend?
The premise of my book is that sovereignty does prevail. The premise is that there is such a quest for sovereignty that we have this massive wave of devolution – separatism, populism, etc. And what that does is create more and more new states – Catalonia, South Sudan, East Timor – and it also creates devolutionary movements within countries: California, Brexit, Calexit. London is gaining greater autonomy by trying to underwrite the UK. These are all national populist, sovereignty-type movements. I actually celebrate that in the book. One subset of that is urbanization. You can’t have a successful, stable policy in the 21st century unless it has some type of stable city at its anchor. It applies to Congo and England – it’s the same logic. It’s possible that great, global multiethnic cities like London and Singapore can win out over the forces of ethno-nationalism. Like in Singapore, you have harmonious relations among ethnic groups. But I’m not saying that cities displace states. They become like states. They start to act more and more autonomously with everything that they do.
When we talk about world politics, we’re always speculating about the prospects of the big powers, the big dogs. But how should “smaller powers” navigate the world as it is emerging – the New Zealands, the South Africas, the Thailands of this world. How do they prosper?
That’s something I’m very interested in. I think that small states in the world – those that are well-governed, wealthy, with high human capital – already do navigate the system extremely well. They have high-performing governments, and they use them as their resources well. They make alliances and friendships with as many other powers as they can, simultaneously: “multi-alignment”, as I call it. Big countries actually learn from small countries how to do that well. So whether an increasingly autonomous city or a newly independent country, small states should look at the role models – Norway and the UAE. The UAE is based so much on Singapore. They basically copied and pasted. This is “diplomacity” – diplomacy among cities.
But I’m not saying that cities displace states. They become like states. They start to act more and more autonomously with everything that they do.
As supply chains expand and become more robust, how will countries, cities, and people deal with resource limitations?
The purpose of supply chains is to optimize resources. If all of our societies had autarky, then we wouldn’t need to produce anything that we consume from anywhere else in the world. Just look at food, water, and energy – leaving aside complicated things like iPhones – these are three most important things. Every country in the word imports more food than it did last year, and the year before, and the year before that. And the same is increasingly true of water and energy. So we cope with resource scarcity through supply chains. They get more and more complicated as countries and people want to reap more profits. That’s what I call the supply chain tug of war. It’s happening all around the world every day.
In Connectography, you also mention the importance of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and how they have been used to make regions more economically competitive. In between all of this, isn’t there a risk of a race to the bottom, where political units like countries or megacities will end up competing for the same slice of the pie by reducing tax rates, decreasing environmental regulations, hiking tariffs, and the like?
That’s a very old debate. I think back in the 1980s and 90s, we probably [experienced] a race to the bottom a lot. But not anymore, because it’s wrong. Maybe back then, Asian countries were competing for the same supply chains. Believe it or not, right now it’s a race to the top in Asia for investment. Foreigners are being induced to transfer technology. China at some point pivoted from being in a race to the bottom to a race to the top. They’re now so successful that the US is blocking their mergers. A lot of these countries have moved to a race to the top. One of the things I write in the book is, sadly, that in the US automotive industry, Tennessee, Alabama, and Michigan are competing in a race to the bottom. States within the US are engaging in what used to be an Asian-style race to the bottom. SEZs are about regulatory convergence and improving standards. They definitely indicate a race to the top. If you look at every single country that has these zones, you have huge spillover effects.
All SEZs are for different things. Maritime nations might have maritime SEZs. If it weren’t for Kenya’s SEZ ports, Uganda would be screwed because Kenya would always be muscling around Uganda. But the SEZ operates according to international norms. Every country, if smart, will design their zones to take advantage of their resources. Sometimes all a country has is a large market. But, for example, Rwanda has increasingly set up these zones. It [creates them] for China and for tech companies, but they do offer some human capital. No two zones are really the same, so I don’t worry about 10 of them popping up in 10 different countries, undercutting themselves.
For example, Japan could choose to make automobiles in lower wage countries than Thailand. But it chooses Thailand because it has the right people, the right talent, and sits right in the middle of the region. The investor makes the decision, and investors weigh a million different factors. Rarely does an investor make the wrong decision. When it’s your own money, you tend not to screw up.
Can these “global cities” be built and sustained without rampant economic inequality, a la South Asian laborers in the Gulf, rampant gentrification in the West, etc.?
There are peculiar cases of countries that have such a small population and can’t build themselves. But those are only the [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries. Most countries have their own domestic workforce and build their infrastructure. And, sure, there are a lot of Turkish migrants and Balkan migrants in Europe. But that doesn’t mean there’s a 75% foreign-born population like in the Gulf countries. I think the real question is how long that assimilation of foreigners takes place, and how effective it is. There are a lot of Turks in Germany who have learned German, but a lot who haven’t. Northern European countries need migrants the most, since they have low birthrates. The problem isn’t migration, but assimilation. By any analysis, Dubai is the fastest-growing city in the history of the whole world. Obviously, even with the lack of freedoms they have, [migrants] are coming to live there.
Doesn’t the war in Crimea, China’s actions in the South China Sea, and the recent skirmishes in Kashmir show that borders actually still do matter a lot?
Sure, but that’s a straw man directed at someone else, not me. I’m a political geographer. I’m not to be confused with Tom Friedman any day of the week. My obsession is borders – in fact, more and more borders. The more devolution you have, the more aggregation you have. This is a much more sophisticated form of sovereignty. To the extent that I have critics, they’re people clinging to the world as it was in the 17th century. Around the world, we have more and more sovereignty, so you have more and more interdependence. So, I make maps in the book. The maps tell the truth. They don’t conform to 17th century theory. I make explicitly clear that infrastructure is a lot of geopolitical expansionism. I’ve noticed that one or two reviews [of Connectography] ask “What about Crimea?” I have a whole goddamn chapter about Crimea. The biggest way that Russia has been violating Crimean sovereignty is not the takeover, but the pipelines. You hear world leaders say that Crimea is evidence that we have to be tough, strong, on our guard. All of that is true, but it’s also totally trite – rubbish. Crimea is evidence that countries use infrastructure to invade each other. It goes back to the British East India Company, the Ottomans, and the Chinese now. Crimea is irrelevant. As far as I’m concerned, sovereignty is a great theoretical principle, but infrastructure is more powerful. That’s the thesis of the book.
My obsession is borders – in fact, more and more borders. The more devolution you have, the more aggregation you have. This is a much more sophisticated form of sovereignty. To the extent that I have critics, they’re people clinging to the world as it was in the 17th century
In your newer, just-published book, Technocracy in America: Rise of the Info-State, you make the bold claim that “direct technocracy,” or a government led by experts, is the ideal form of government. What countries right now would you categorize as direct technocracies?
The book focuses heavily on a couple of small countries and a couple of big countries. Both have certain attributes that I’m looking for. Among them is a directly elected executive, but also an executive by committee – a collective presidency. Then I’m looking for a legislature that uses big data to augment the lack of voter participation. But I’m also looking for universal or mandatory voting. I’m looking for stronger administrative bodies in the legislature rather than just representatives. There are too many representatives and not enough administrators in America. So, I’m looking for governments that are looking to modify their constitutions, rather than reacting via cases coming up to the Supreme Court. They’re saying, “Hey, our constitution is 300 years old – why don’t we think about its relevance?” So, I use the examples of data privacy, as well as DNA evidence and the courts. You really shouldn’t be sitting and waiting for [these issues] to land at your desk – you can address them now. But the most important thing is the civil service. It’s the hallmark of the info-state – to have a strong civil service. That keeps its trains running on time. Germany, Switzerland, Singapore – some of the direct technocracy examples I use – all have very good civil services.
Technocracy in America also contains some pretty radical ideas on how to reform American institutions, such as replacing the Senate with an “Assembly of Governors,” and putting in place a “seven-member presidency.” But how can politicians sell these ideas to the American people?
The problem is the politicians themselves. I’m actually saying that I could replace a whole lot of politicians with IBM Watson. Look, I have a very healthy and well-justified disrespect for most politicians, unless they have administrative experience. How do I sell the idea? I’ve written about these issues before. Governors are totally for it, but they don’t have to fight that fight. The paradox is that I’m not an elected official in the US. I don’t get to be the czar who makes these things happen. Right now, I’m less concerned with execution as I am with being right. The most important thing is analysis. It’s not about reviews – it’s about being correct. Then, you’re able to be more convincing. The book has only just come out, but all the initial projections seem to be true. Had Trump not won, I would have still published the book, but we would have become very complacent as a country. But now that Trump has won and is President, you actually have a lot more people talking about these issues.
What is the biggest piece of advice you could offer President Trump as he begins his term?
He has his heart in the right place on infrastructure. He just has to get it right. And there’s a lot of precedence on how to do infrastructure finance, public private partnerships, and covered bonds. So there are a lot of ways to do these right. And it’s essential to do all of them at the same time. He says [he is going to invest] $1 trillion – great. It should be $3 trillion, according to the Army Corps of Engineers. My advice [for him] is to learn how to do it right. We have very good estimates of the deficits in roads, broadband, and other infrastructure areas. We can geographically identify the worst bottlenecks. You can’t pick one thing. Idaho and Iowa don’t need two roads – they need one road that connects both of them. I’m not talking about pork barrel spending, but about regional connections. But because representatives don’t think that way, they’re not a big fan of this type of logic. They aren’t interested in things, but are [interested in] local corruption. So, as a corollary to my answer about infrastructure, it’s think regionally and think national – not locally. Local infrastructure doesn’t get the job done. You need national-scale infrastructure.
